Dedicated mobile device in support of secure optical data exchange with stand alone certificate authority

ABSTRACT

An approach is disclosed that optically transmit data from a dedicated mobile device (DMD) to another device. Optically transmitting the data is performed by displaying the data on a display screen included in the DMD. The approach further optically receives data at the DMD. The data is received at a digital camera included in the DMD. Based on the exchanged data, the DMD determines if the DMD and the other device are bound to each other.

BACKGROUND

Extended verbose communication from a physically isolated device usingtraditional approaches is static and open to receipt by any nearbyoptical device. Extended bi-directional communication from a Stand AloneCertificate Authority (SACA) device via current methods is difficult andsusceptible to interception (i.e. theft of USB drive, etc.). Further,traditional approaches are unable to remotely audit security controlsdata while providing assurances of confidentiality, integrity andavailability of critical systems. Traditional approaches cannot provideassurances that critical systems are secure, effectively managed, havenot been compromised, and are not vulnerable for exploitation byoutsiders. These shortcomings of traditional approaches impedesuccessful management and security auditing of such critical systems.

SUMMARY

An approach is disclosed that optically transmit data from a dedicatedmobile device (DMD) to another device. Optically transmitting the datais performed by displaying the data on a display screen included in theDMD. The approach further optically receives data at the DMD. The datais received at a digital camera included in the DMD. Based on theexchanged data, the DMD determines if the DMD and the other device arebound to each other.

The foregoing is a summary and thus contains, by necessity,simplifications, generalizations, and omissions of detail; consequently,those skilled in the art will appreciate that the summary isillustrative only and is not intended to be in any way limiting. Otheraspects, inventive features, and advantages of the present inventionwill be apparent in the non-limiting detailed description set forthbelow.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention may be better understood, and its numerousobjects, features, and advantages made apparent to those skilled in theart by referencing the accompanying drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a data processing system in which themethods described herein can be implemented;

FIG. 2 provides an extension of the information handling systemenvironment shown in FIG. 1 to illustrate that the methods describedherein can be performed on a wide variety of information handlingsystems which operate in a networked environment;

FIG. 3 is a flowchart and component diagram depicting an approach thatmanufactures components bound to one another to provide a secureinterface to a critical system;

FIG. 4 is a flowchart depicting the transmission and reception of datain a secure optical data exchange environment;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart depicting the Secure Optical Data Exchange (SODE)data transmission;

FIG. 6 is a flowchart depicting Secure Optical Data Exchange (SODE)postscript processing;

FIG. 7 is a flowchart depicting steps taken to build a unique OpticalCommunication Mounting Frame (OCMF) for use with a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) when engaged with a critical system;

FIG. 8 is a flowchart depicting steps taken to bind the componentsutilized to interface with a critical system during manufacturing andinstallation;

FIG. 9 is a component diagram depicting usage of a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) security enclosure;

FIG. 10 is a flowchart depicting steps to manufacture a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) enclosed in a security enclosure, bind the components, anduse the DMD with a critical system; and

FIG. 11 is a component diagram depicting usage of a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD).

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIGS. 1-11 describe an approach that provides secure communication witha critical system. The approach includes an Optical CommunicationsMounting Frame (OCMF) to stabilize and secure the air gapped pathway foroptical data communication between a Dedicated Mobile Device (DMD) andStand Alone Certificate Authority (SACA) used in Authentication,Authorization, and Audit eco systems. The SACA is the critical systemthat communicates with the DMD.

In traditional systems, extended verbose communication from a physicallyisolated device via current methods is static and open to receipt by anypresent optical device. In the approach described herein, physicalplacement and maintaining continuous secure optical communicationpathways uses physical stability for specific immediate proximity inbi-directional communication. The approach thwarts interception bythird-party devices, supports specific air gap isolation, is bound to aspecific DMD that is part of a SACA communication eco system, andsupports a specific stable optical bi directional ‘camera to displaypathways’ that is not currently available in traditional systems.

In one embodiment of the approach, the OCMF is a mounting frame devicethat enables support for continuous bidirectional optical communicationbetween a SACA and a DMD. The OCMF provides both air gap security,physical stability of the communication pathways, and is logically boundto the DMD and the SACA devices through data within the approach that isconsumed and processed by the SACA.

In one embodiment, the OCMF includes a latched compartment area withcompression foam on the hinged latching cover that supports the secureand tight physical integration of a DMD against the interior DMD socketridge within the compartment. In one embodiment, the OCMF includes aUnique ID (UID) that is barcoded by the Manufacture (MFG) and attachedto the OCMF. In an embodiment, the OCMF is paired with a specific DMD bythe MFG and has the DMD's UID barcoded and attached to the OCMF. In oneembodiment, the manufacturer Certificate Authority (CA) digital signsthe UIDs and barcodes the details for reading with its public key. Inone embodiment, the interior on the OCMF is lined with a fully whitebackground over which the barcoding data is embedded. In one embodiment,the embedding of the barcoding is distorted on the interior surface ofthe OCMF with the distortion of the barcoding allowing for clearrepresentation of barcoding from the physical view of the SACA Camera.

In one embodiment, the continued presence of the barcoding within theOCMF is a precondition to optical communication between the DMD and theSACA. In one embodiment, the OCMF is designed to optimize and stabilizethe data exchange along the optical pathways between the cameras anddisplays for both the SACA and the DMD. In one embodiment, the OCMF hasmounting rails along three sides of the base for securing over the SACA.If a single SACA display is used, then in one embodiment, the OCMF doesnot cover all of the SACA display and allows for the GUI display anduser interaction with the portion of the SACA display not covered by theOCMF. Light entry or exit from the interior of the OCMF when attached tothe SACA is limited by the lining of the compression foam around theinterior base of the OCMF and by the lining of compression foam aroundthe interior DMD socket ridge.

As previously mentioned, the approach includes a Dedicated Mobile Device(DMD) that is logically bound to an OCMF and SACA. The DMD provides asecure data communications pathway between the SACA and the servicesprovided by the manufacturer (MFG) of the SACA eco system. In oneembodiment, the services provided are cloud-based Software as a Service(SaaS) that would include private data persistence.

In one embodiment, the DMD is contained within a tamper resistantenclosure with dimensions and physical keying features for alignment anduse inside a matching OCMF. For example, cut outs on the enclosure areunique to the OCMF to which the DMD is paired so that only the assignedDMD will be able to fit into the OCMF like a puzzle piece. The tamperresistant enclosure provides for physical isolation to prevent operationof all inputs. In one embodiment, all buttons (e.g., home, volume, etc.)are inaccessible due to the enclosure with the only exposed interfacesbeing the touch screen and camera with the touch screen used to receiveinput from the user and also to display information to be received bythe SACA's camera, and the DMD camera being used to receive datadisplayed on the SACA's display screen. In one embodiment, the DMD has aUnique ID (UID) that is created by the Manufacture (MFG). A crypto keypair is generated by the MFG and stored on the device with the privatekey being stored on secure memory of the DMD. A digital certificate withthe DMD public key is created by the MFG Certificate Authority (CA) andis also stored on a secure memory of the DMD. The UID's of the DMD andthe dedicated Optical Communication Mounting Frame (OCMF) and SACA aresigned by the MFG CA and are additionally stored in the secure memory ofthe DMD. The public key of the SACA is also signed and stored on the DMDby the MFG.

The DMD is provisioned to only allow Cellular and Optical datacommunication with authorized entities. In one embodiment, the Cellularauthorized entities are pre-determined phone numbers that are stored inthe DMD's memory and are not alterable by a user of the DMD. In oneembodiment, the DMD only allows for end user operation of a limited(e.g., single application, etc.) on the DMD device. In this embodiment,a DMD application is programmed for reception and display of secureOptical Data Communication with a dedicated SACA. To reduce the risk ofcompromise or hacking by unauthorized users to either the DMD or theassigned SACA, in one embodiment, the DMD does not allow for anyexternal I/O operations (e.g., no WiFi, etc.) other than allowingoperation of user inputs to the face of the DMD touch screen or viaOptical Data Communications (e.g., camera capturing informationdisplayed by the assigned SACA, DMD display displaying information tothe SACA that is captured by the SACA's camera, etc.).

Should the DMD be extracted from the enclosure, the DMD is provisionedto lock down operations in order to prevent any I/O at the device frombecoming operational. In the embodiment utilizing the securityenclosure, the charging port of the DMD may be inaccessible with thebattery-powered DMD charged by inductive charging. In one embodiment,the enclosure in which the DMD is placed is also an inductive charger sothat the DMD may be inductively charged by providing power to theenclosure which, in turn, inductively charges the DMD. In a furtherembodiment, the DMD is always on and transmits a “heart beat” at ratedetermined by the MFG. This heartbeat can include GPS information of theDMD that can be transmitted, via Cellular communications, to apre-assigned phone number corresponding to a system that tracks theDMD's usage and health. In a further embodiment, the DMD defaults into apower saving mode during time of non-operations or non-movement.

In one embodiment, the DMD is provisioned by the manufacturer with analpha-numeric password for the logical unlocking of the device and thispassword is provided to user at time of receipt. In one embodiment, thelimited applications accessible from the DMD include an application thatallows the user to change the password with the application ensuringthat the password is of suitable strength. Finally, in one embodiment,the DMD is embedded with Remote Device Management (RDM) software that isadministered by the manufacturer that allows the manufacturer to updatethe DMD firmware and software remotely using a pre-assigned phone numberthat the DMD is configured to accept as a valid phone number withadditional safeguards (e.g., passwords, etc.) to ensure that amalevolent user is not attempting to access the DMD using a spoofedtelephone number.

The following detailed description will generally follow the summary, asset forth above, further explaining and expanding the definitions of thevarious aspects and embodiments as necessary. To this end, this detaileddescription first sets forth a computing environment in FIG. 1 that issuitable to implement the software and/or hardware techniques associatedwith the disclosure. A networked environment is illustrated in FIG. 2 asan extension of the basic computing environment, to emphasize thatmodern computing techniques can be performed across multiple discretedevices.

FIG. 1 illustrates information handling system 100, which is asimplified example of a computer system capable of performing thecomputing operations described herein. Information handling system 100includes one or more processors 110 coupled to processor interface bus112. Processor interface bus 112 connects processors 110 to Northbridge115, which is also known as the Memory Controller Hub (MCH). Northbridge115 connects to system memory 120 and provides a means for processor(s)110 to access the system memory. Graphics controller 125 also connectsto Northbridge 115. In one embodiment, PCI Express bus 118 connectsNorthbridge 115 to graphics controller 125. Graphics controller 125connects to display device 130, such as a computer monitor.

Northbridge 115 and Southbridge 135 connect to each other using bus 119.In one embodiment, the bus is a Direct Media Interface (DMI) bus thattransfers data at high speeds in each direction between Northbridge 115and Southbridge 135. In another embodiment, a Peripheral ComponentInterconnect (PCI) bus connects the Northbridge and the Southbridge.Southbridge 135, also known as the I/O Controller Hub (ICH) is a chipthat generally implements capabilities that operate at slower speedsthan the capabilities provided by the Northbridge. Southbridge 135typically provides various busses used to connect various components.These busses include, for example, PCI and PCI Express busses, an ISAbus, a System Management Bus (SMBus or SMB), and/or a Low Pin Count(LPC) bus. The LPC bus often connects low-bandwidth devices, such asboot ROM 196 and “legacy” I/O devices (using a “super I/O” chip). The“legacy” I/O devices (198) can include, for example, serial and parallelports, keyboard, mouse, and/or a floppy disk controller. The LPC busalso connects Southbridge 135 to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 195.Other components often included in Southbridge 135 include a DirectMemory Access (DMA) controller, a Programmable Interrupt Controller(PIC), and a storage device controller, which connects Southbridge 135to nonvolatile storage device 185, such as a hard disk drive, using bus184.

ExpressCard 155 is a slot that connects hot-pluggable devices to theinformation handling system. ExpressCard 155 supports both PCI Expressand USB connectivity as it connects to Southbridge 135 using both theUniversal Serial Bus (USB) and the PCI Express bus. Southbridge 135includes USB Controller 140 that provides USB connectivity to devicesthat connect to the USB. These devices include webcam (camera) 150,infrared (IR) receiver 148, keyboard and trackpad 144, and Bluetoothdevice 146, which provides for wireless personal area networks (PANs).USB Controller 140 also provides USB connectivity to other miscellaneousUSB connected devices 142, such as a mouse, removable nonvolatilestorage device 145, modems, network cards, ISDN connectors, fax,printers, USB hubs, and many other types of USB connected devices. Whileremovable nonvolatile storage device 145 is shown as a USB-connecteddevice, removable nonvolatile storage device 145 could be connectedusing a different interface, such as a Firewire interface, etcetera.

Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) device 175 connects to Southbridge 135via the PCI or PCI Express bus 172. LAN device 175 typically implementsone of the IEEE 802.11 standards of over-the-air modulation techniquesthat all use the same protocol to wirelessly communicate betweeninformation handling system 100 and another computer system or device.Optical storage device 190 connects to Southbridge 135 using Serial ATA(SATA) bus 188. Serial ATA adapters and devices communicate over ahigh-speed serial link. The Serial ATA bus also connects Southbridge 135to other forms of storage devices, such as hard disk drives. Audiocircuitry 160, such as a sound card, connects to Southbridge 135 via bus158. Audio circuitry 160 also provides functionality such as audioline-in and optical digital audio in port 162, optical digital outputand headphone jack 164, internal speakers 166, and internal microphone168. Ethernet controller 170 connects to Southbridge 135 using a bus,such as the PCI or PCI Express bus. Ethernet controller 170 connectsinformation handling system 100 to a computer network, such as a LocalArea Network (LAN), the Internet, and other public and private computernetworks.

While FIG. 1 shows one information handling system, an informationhandling system may take many forms. For example, an informationhandling system may take the form of a desktop, server, portable,laptop, notebook, or other form factor computer or data processingsystem. In addition, an information handling system may take other formfactors such as a personal digital assistant (PDA), a gaming device, ATMmachine, a portable telephone device, a communication device or otherdevices that include a processor and memory.

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM 195) shown in FIG. 1 and describedherein to provide security functions is but one example of a hardwaresecurity module (HSM). Therefore, the TPM described and claimed hereinincludes any type of HSM including, but not limited to, hardwaresecurity devices that conform to the Trusted Computing Groups (TCG)standard, and entitled “Trusted Platform Module (TPM) SpecificationVersion 1.2.” The TPM is a hardware security subsystem that may beincorporated into any number of information handling systems, such asthose outlined in FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 provides an extension of the information handling systemenvironment shown in FIG. 1 to illustrate that the methods describedherein can be performed on a wide variety of information handlingsystems that operate in a networked environment. Types of informationhandling systems range from small handheld devices, such as handheldcomputer/mobile telephone 210 to large mainframe systems, such asmainframe computer 270. Examples of handheld computer 210 includepersonal digital assistants (PDAs), personal entertainment devices, suchas MP3 players, portable televisions, and compact disc players. Otherexamples of information handling systems include pen, or tablet,computer 220, laptop, or notebook, computer 230, workstation 240,personal computer system 250, and server 260. Other types of informationhandling systems that are not individually shown in FIG. 2 arerepresented by information handling system 280. As shown, the variousinformation handling systems can be networked together using computernetwork 200. Types of computer networks that can be used to interconnectthe various information handling systems include Local Area Networks(LANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), the Internet, the PublicSwitched Telephone Network (PSTN), other wireless networks, and anyother network topology that can be used to interconnect the informationhandling systems. Many of the information handling systems includenonvolatile data stores, such as hard drives and/or nonvolatile memory.Some of the information handling systems shown in FIG. 2 depictsseparate nonvolatile data stores (server 260 utilizes nonvolatile datastore 265, mainframe computer 270 utilizes nonvolatile data store 275,and information handling system 280 utilizes nonvolatile data store285). The nonvolatile data store can be a component that is external tothe various information handling systems or can be internal to one ofthe information handling systems. In addition, removable nonvolatilestorage device 145 can be shared among two or more information handlingsystems using various techniques, such as connecting the removablenonvolatile storage device 145 to a USB port or other connector of theinformation handling systems.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart and component diagram depicting an approach thatmanufactures components bound to one another to provide a secureinterface to a critical system. FIG. 3 processing commences at 300 andshows the steps taken by a manufacturing process that sets up thevarious components. At step 310, the process builds a unique opticalcommunication mounting frame (OCMF 320) for use with a particulardedicated mobile device (DMD 330) when engaged with critical system,such as Stand Alone Certificate Authority (SACA 375). See FIG. 7 andcorresponding text that shows the details of building OCMF 320.

At step 325, the process sets up unique DMD 330 for use with criticalsystem. See FIG. 8 and corresponding text that shows the details ofbuilding DMD 330. After set up, the DMD is assigned to operator 360 andthe operator is provided with usage instructions and any codes (e.g.,passwords, etc.) needed to operate DMD 330. As shown, DMD 330 includescamera 331 that is used to capture data displayed on display 380included in SACA system 375. In one embodiment, display 380 is adedicated display used to display information to the DMD, while inanother embodiment, a portion of a display, such as operator display390, is used to display information to the DMD. DMD 330 also includesdisplay 332 that is used to display information that is captured bycamera 385 that is included in SACA system 375. OCMF 320 is placed overthe display (either display 380 or 390) and DMD 330 is placed face downon the opening in the top of OCMF with the opening in OCMF being largeenough to allow for display 332 to be visible from SACA camera 385 andalso large enough to allow DMD camera 331 to view the SACA displaythrough the OCMF. The OCMF is an apparatus with sides and, in oneembodiment, information coded on the sides of the OCMF is captured bythe respective cameras (camera 331 and camera 385) to ensure that OCMF320 is in place before communication is allowed between DMD 330 andcritical SACA system 375. A depiction of OCMF 320 covering display 380of SACA system 375 is shown at 395.

At step 340, the process pairs DMD 330 with OCMF 320 so this unique DMDis the only device that will communicate with this OCMF using theoptical communications described herein. In one embodiment, OCMF 320 iscoded with information read by camera 331 with DMD 330 inhibitingcommunication operations with SACA 375 if the assigned OCMF is notpresent. The coded information is printed on the inside of OCMF andmight be distorted based on the shape of the OCMF and also might beencrypted so that only assigned devices (e.g., DMD 330, SACA 375, etc.)can read and decrypt the coded data.

At step 350, the process issues configured DMD 330 to key person(operator 360) to access critical system using the assigned DMD and theassigned OCMF. At step 370, the process installs and integrates the OCMFwith critical SACA system 375. As previously mentioned, OCMF 320 isencoded with information printed on the sides of the unit that are readby SACA camera 385 and, in one embodiment, SACA 375 inhibits anycommunication with any devices if the assigned OCMF is not present. Aspreviously mentioned, the coded information may be printed in adistorted fashion based on the shape of OCMF and also might be encryptedso that only devices, such as SACA 375, assigned to the particular OCMFcan read and decrypt such coded information.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart depicting the transmission and reception of datain a secure optical data exchange environment. FIG. 4 processingcommences at 400 and shows the steps taken by a process performed by thetransmitter in a Secure Optical Data Exchange. At step 404, thetransmitter process generates session key that is stored in memory area408. At step 412, the transmitter process encrypts session key withreceiver public key and the encrypted session key is stored in memoryarea 416. At step 420, the transmitter process converts the encryptedsession key (ESK) to an image representation, such as a barcode, etc.with the image stored in memory area 424. At step 428, the transmitterprocess generates a transmission announcement (TA) image, such as abarcode, with the transmission announcement images being displayed atstep 436 on the display screen so that it can be captured (received) bythe receiver's digital camera.

Receiver processing commences at 440 and shows the steps taken by aprocess performed by the receiver in the Secure Optical Data Exchange.At step 444, the receiver process receives the transmission announcementimage over the Optical Communication Mounting Frame (OCMF) air gap 438by the receiver's digital camera. The OCMF air gap is the air spacebetween the dedicated mobile device (DMD) and the stand alonecertificate authority (SACA) critical system (see FIG. 3, elements 320,330, and 375 for depictions of these devices).

At step 448, the receiver process activates one or more routines neededfor the intended transmission function based on the receivedtransmission announcement. At step 452, the receiver process generates avisual acknowledgement image indicating that the receiver is ready toreceive data from the transmitter. The visual acknowledgement image isstored in memory area 456 and displayed on the receiver's display deviceat step 460 so that it can be received by the transmitter's digitalcamera.

At step 464, the transmitter process receives the acknowledgment at thetransmitter's digital camera. At step 468, the transmitter processdisplays the encrypted session key (ESK) image that is retrieved frommemory area 424 and displayed on the transmitter's display for receptionby the receiver's digital camera. At predefined process 470, thetransmitter process performs the Secure Optical Data Exchange (SODE)Data Transmission routine to visually transmit data to the receiver overOCMF air gap 438 (see FIG. 4 and corresponding text for processingdetails). Inhibiting non-visual electronic communication between thetransmitter and receiver prevents malevolent bystanders from being ableto electronically snoop and receive the contents on the data that isbeing transmitted.

At step 472, the receiver process receives the encrypted session key(ESK) image displayed by the transmitter process with the receiverprocess receiving the ESK image using the receiver's digital camera. Thereceived ESK image is stored in memory area 476. At step 480, thereceiver process converts the received ESK image to the actual encryptedsession key (ESK) that is stored in memory area 484. At step 488, thereceiver process decrypts the encrypted session key (ESK) using thereceiver's private key as the ESK was encrypted using the receiver'spublic key. The decrypted session key is securely stored for encryptingand decrypting transmissions between the receiver and transmitter.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart depicting the Secure Optical Data Exchange (SODE)data transmission. FIG. 5 processing commences at 500 and shows thesteps taken by a process performed by a transmitter in a SODE DataTransmission. At step 502, the transmitter process identifies a datablock of clear text to transmit to the receiver. This text is stored inmemory area 504. At step 506, the transmitter process generates a hashvalue of the clear text data block. At step 508, the transmitter processencrypts the data block using the session key and the encrypted datablock (EDB) is stored in memory area 510. At step 512, the transmitterprocess converts the EDB to an image that is stored in memory area 514.This image is displayed on the transmitter's display at step 516 so thatit can be captured by the receiver's digital camera and processed.

Receiver processing commences at 518 and shows the steps taken by aprocess performed by the receiver in the SODE Data Transmission. At step520, the receiver process reads the image of the EDB, converts the imageto text, decrypts the EDB with the session key, and securely stores thedecrypted data in memory area 522. At step 524, the receiver processgenerates a hash value of the clear text data block and the hash valueis stored in memory area 526. At step 528, the receiver process convertsthe hash value to an image representation that is stored in memory area530. At step 532, the receiver process displays the hash imagerepresentation so that it can be captured by the transmitter's digitalcamera.

At step 534, the transmitter process reads the hash image representationand converts it to a hash value. At step 536, the transmitter processcompares the hash value received from the receiver with the hash valuecomputed by the transmitter at step 506 and encrypts the result of thecomparison with the session key and displays an image representation onthe display screen which is captured by the receiver's digital camera.

At step 542, the receiver process reads the image of the hash comparisonresults and decrypts the comparison results with the session key. Thereceiver process determines as to whether hash values match (decision544). If the hash values match, then decision 544 branches to the ‘yes’branch to perform steps 546 through 550. On the other hand, if the hashvalues do not match, then decision 544 branches to the ‘no’ branch toperform steps 552 and 554. If the hash value match then, at step 546,the receiver process adds the clear text to cache 545 for inclusion inthe transmission payload. At step 548, the receiver process generates anacknowledgement image signifying that the receiver is ready to receivethe next data block as described above and this acknowledgement image isdisplayed to the transmitter at step 550. If the hash values do notmatch then, at step 552, the receiver process flushes the clear textdata and, at step 554, the receiver process generates an acknowledgementimage signifying that the receiver failed to successfully receive thedata block and that it needs to be resent to the receiver with step 550being performed to display this acknowledgement image to thetransmitter.

At step 556, the transmitter process reads the acknowledgement imagedisplayed on the receivers display device using the transmitter'sdigital camera. The transmitter process determines as to whether theacknowledgement requested to repeat the block or requested a new block(decision 558). If the acknowledgement is to repeat the same data block,then decision 558 branches to the ‘yes’ branch whereupon at step 560 thetransmitter uses the same data block and returns to step 502 to repeatthe steps taken to transmit the data block. On the other hand, if theacknowledgement does not request a repeat transmission of the datablock, then decision 558 branches to the ‘no’ branch for furtherprocessing. The transmitter process determines as to whether there aremore data blocks to transmit to the receiver (decision 562). If thereare more blocks, then decision 562 branches to the ‘yes’ branchwhereupon, at step 564, the process identifies the next data block to betransmitted and processing returns to step 502 to transmit this datablock to the receiver. This looping continues until there are no moredata blocks to transmit to the receiver, at which point decision 562branches to the ‘no’ branch whereupon, at predefined process 566, thetransmitter process performs the SODE Postscript routine (see FIG. 5 andcorresponding text for processing details).

FIG. 6 is a flowchart depicting Secure Optical Data Exchange (SODE)postscript processing. FIG. 6 processing commences at 600 and shows thesteps taken by a process performed by a transmitter in SODE DataTransmission during postscript processing. At step 604, the transmitterprocess generates transmission closure announcement (TC) that is storedin memory area 608. At step 612, the transmitter process encrypts the TCwith the session key resulting in encrypted TC (ETC) that is stored inmemory area 616. At step 620, the transmitter process converts the ETCto an image representation that is stored in memory area 624 anddisplayed on the display device at step 628.

Receiver processing commences at 632 and shows the steps taken by aprocess performed by the receiver in SODE Data Transmission duringpostscript processing. At step 636, the receiver process uses thereceiver's digital camera and reads the image of the ETC displayed bythe transmitter. The receiver decrypts the ETC with the session key andsecurely stores the TC in memory area 640. At step 644, the receiverprocess displays an encrypted acknowledgement back to the transmitter.

At step 646, the transmitter process receives the acknowledgement fromthe receiver and, at step 648, the transmitter process checks theintegrity of all data blocks and generates a digital hash of all of thesession clear text. The text is received from memory area 504 and thehash is stored in memory area 664.

At step 650, the receiver process checks the integrity of all completedata blocks generating a digital hash of all session clear text. Thedata block data is retrieved from cache 545 and the hash is stored inmemory area 652. At step 656, the receiver process converts the hashfrom memory area 652 to an image representation that is stored in memoryarea 654 and displays the image on the receiver's display device so thatit can be read by the transmitter's digital camera.

At step 668, the transmitter process receives the hash from the receiverand stores it in memory area 672 and compares the hash value to the hashvalue stored in memory area 664 with the comparison resulting in agenerated message indicating whether the hash values match (e.g.,success, fail, etc.). At step 676, the transmitter process displays animage on the display device indicating to the receiver process whetherthe hash values matched.

At step 680, the receiver process reads and decrypts messages displayedby the transmitter. The receiver process determines whether the hashvalues match based on the image received from the transmitter (decision684). If the hash values match, then decision 684 branches to the ‘yes’branch to perform steps taken during transmission success. On the otherhand, if the hash values do not match, then decision 684 branches to the‘no’ branch to perform steps taken during transmission failure.

The transmitter process also determines whether the hash values match(decision 678). If the hash values match, then decision 678 branches tothe ‘yes’ branch to perform steps taken during transmission success. Onthe other hand, if the hash values do not match, then decision 678branches to the ‘no’ branch to perform steps taken during transmissionfailure.

When transmission is successful then, at step 690, the following stepsare performed at the various devices. At the secured system (SACA,etc.), the DMD initiates communication with a SaaS backend system anduploads data to a dedicated persistence repository and the DMD confirmsthe upload with the SACA. At the DMD, the DMD communicates and recordsstate transfer completion with the SaaS backend system. Finally, at theSACA, the secured system displays transmission success on an exposed GUIdisplayed on a display to the user.

On the other hand, when the hash values do not match indicating a failedtransmission then, at step 694 the following steps are performed at thevarious devices. At the DMD, the DMD initiates communication with theSaaS backend system and uploads a record of the SODE failure to thebackend system. The DMD further confirms the SaaS recording of failurewith the SACA system. The secured system (SACA) displays a failuremessage on an exposed GUI displayed on a display to the user and furtherallows the user to retry transferring the data to the backend system.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart depicting steps taken to build a unique OpticalCommunication Mounting Frame (OCMF) for use with a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) when engaged with a critical system. FIG. 7 processingcommences at 700 and shows the steps taken by a manufacturing processthat manufactures the Optical Communication Mounting Frame (OCMF) andpairs the OCMF with a dedicated mobile device (DMD) and a secure system(Stand Alone Certificate Authority, or “SACA”) device.

At step 710, the manufacturing process installs a latched compartmentarea on OCMF 320 with a compression foam on the hinged latching coverthat supports the secure and tight physical integration of DMD 330against the interior DMD socket ridge within the compartment. At step720, the manufacturing process assigns a unique identifier (UID) that isbarcoded by the Manufacture (MFG) and attached to the OCMF, such asbeing inscribed on the interior surface of the OCMF. At step 725, themanufacturing process pairs OCMF 320 with a specific DMD 330 with theDMD's UID barcoded and attached to the OCMF, such as being encoded onthe interior surface of the OCMF where it can be read by both the DMD'sdigital camera 331 as well as by digital camera 385 included in SACAdevice 375.

At step 730, the manufacturing process digitally signs the UIDs and thebarcodes with the MFG private key for reading by encrypting with the MFGpublic key. At step 740, the manufacturing process lines the interior ofOCMF 320 with white background over which the barcoding data isembedded. In one embodiment, at step 750, the manufacturing processdistorts barcode embedding on the interior surface of the OCMF to allowclear representation of barcoding from SACA camera. At step 760, themanufacturing process performed on the OCMF allows the SACA camera 385to view DMD screen 332 and DMD camera 331 to view SACA display 380 withthe OCMF being a somewhat hollow frame through which the cameras canview the respective displays screens.

At step 770, the manufacturing process installs mounting rails on theOCMF for securing over the surface of SACA 375. At step 775, themanufacturing process allows suitable light entry points in SACA 375 toprovide enough light for digital camera usage within the OCMF. Also, atstep 775, this embodiment should allow for the suitable light for SACAcamera usage in the interior of the OCMF by the appropriate illuminationof the SACA Display. At step 780, the manufacturing process makescontinued presence of the barcoding within the OCMF a precondition foroptical communication with SACA 375. In this embodiment, if the OCMF isnot present then software installed in the OCMF inhibits communicationbetween the DMD and the OCMF using the respective digital cameras anddisplay screens. At step 790, the manufacturing process performs a dataexchange between the SACA display and the assigned DMD camera and theDMD display and the SACA camera.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart depicting steps taken to bind the componentsutilized to interface with a critical system during manufacturing andinstallation. FIG. 8 processing commences at 800 and shows the stepstaken by a process that binds the various components to one another. Thesteps are shown being divided between steps performed at themanufacturing facility before arriving on site (starting at 810) andsteps performed at the facility where the secure SACA system isoperating (starting at step 850). These steps do not necessarily have tobe performed at the shown locations with these steps and locationssimply being one possible embodiment.

At step 820, the process generates the OCMFs unique identifier (UID) andthis identifier is coded onto the interior surface of the OCMF. At step825, the process obtains the DMD's UID from the DMD and codes this UIDonto the interior surface of the OCMF. At step 830, the process signsthe DMD's UID and the OCMF's UID using a private key of the manufacturercertificate authority (CA). At step 840, the process codes the signedUID of both the DMD and the OCMF onto the interior surface of the OCMF.

Steps 855 through 885 are shown as being performed at the secured (SACA)device facility, such as at the time of installation of the SACA orintegration of the OCMF and DMD with an installed SACA device. At step855, the process initiates an enrollment process at the SACA deviceusing a user interface provided at the SACA device. This enrollmentprocess binds the unique assigned OCMF and the unique assigned DMD tothis particular SACA device.

At step 860, the process has a user or technician mount (when prompted),the OCMF that was manufactured specifically for this SACA device. TheOCMF is mounted over a display area on the SACA device that is designedfor communication with the DMD. At step 865, the process prompts theuser to mount the assigned DMD on the OCMF that was mounted in step 860and has the user secure the DMD to the OCMF with latches provided on theOCMF. At step 870, the process initiates the SACA and DMD to opticallyexchange public keys using the respective display screens and digitalcameras as well as exchanging UID data that has been signed by themanufacturer CA.

At step 875, the process performed by the SACA and DMD has each devicesecurely store the received public keys received from the other device.At step 880, the process has the SACA device read and validate thecoding from the interior of OCMF with validation performed using theUIDs and keys previously received by the SACA device. At step 885, theprocess performed on the SACA logically binds this particular assignedDMD and the particular assigned OCMF as the exclusive optical devicesfor use with this SACA device. In one embodiment, the SACA inhibitscommunication through the SACA's display screen and digital camera ifthe assigned DMD and OCMF are not present.

As described above, binding can include various types of binding betweenthe various components. Components are logically bound to one anothervia data, such as the exchanged keys and exchanged user identifiers thatidentify a bound component to another component. Components are furthercryptographically bound to one another by having such data encryptedwith keys known to another of the bound components. For example, a UIDencrypted with one component's private key can be decrypted by anothercomponent by using the corresponding public key thus providing a levelof confidence that the data has not been spoofed by an imposter.Finally, the components are physically bound to each other in variousways. One way, as described with regard to other figures, is a uniquephysical shape on an exterior of one component that matches, or fitsinto, a corresponding unique physical shape found on another component.Moreover, one physical component, such as the DMD, is physically matchedto another component, such as the SACA and the OCMF, during amanufacturing process.

FIG. 9 is a component diagram depicting usage of a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) security enclosure. DMD 330 is the electronic device thatcommunicates with a secure system (SACA) utilizing the display screenand digital cameras included in the DMD and SACA device. To prevent DMDfrom malevolent tampering, hacking, or “jail-breaking,” DMD 330 isoptionally secured in secure case 900 during manufacturing or shortlythereafter.

Secure case 900 includes adaptive lens 910 that aligns with digitalcamera aperture 331 of DMD 330. In addition, secure case 900 includescut outs in the surface of the face of the secure case so that such cutouts align with corresponding features found on the surface of OCMF 320so that the secure case fits like a puzzle piece on top of OCMF 320. Inone embodiment, each secure case has a unique pattern of cut outs thatuniquely align with the OCMF that has been assigned to the DMD that isenclosed in the secure case. FIG. 10 has further details regarding themanufacture of the DMD and the secure case in which it is enclosed.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart depicting steps to manufacture a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD) enclosed in a security enclosure, bind the components, anduse the DMD with a critical system. FIG. 10 processing commences at 1000and shows the steps taken by a manufacturing process that manufacturesthe DMD and its enclosure. At step 1010, the manufacturing process formsa tamper resistant enclosure with keying (“cut outs”) features matchingthose on the surface of the OCMF to which the enclosure and associatedDMD is paired.

At step 1020, the manufacturing process performs a physical isolation ofthe enclosed DMD provided by the enclosure with access to the DMD'stouch screen display and digital camera. Other buttons and WiFicommunications are disabled on the DMD. At step 1025, the manufacturingprocess of the enclosure includes inductive charging station componentsthat are able to charge the enclosed DMD without physically connectingthe DMD to a power source. Power is provided to the enclosure and thispower provides the inductive charging of the enclosed DMD. At step 1030,the manufacturing process generates a pair of crypto keys (Publickey-private key) and these keys are stored on secure storage of the DMDwith the DMD's private key being made inaccessible to processes outsideof the DMD.

At step 1040, the manufacturing process retrieves unique identifierscorresponding to the DMD, OCMF, and SACA. These UIDs are signed by themanufacturer certificate authority (CA) and stored in the DMD securestorage. At step 1050, the manufacturing process retrieves public key ofboth the OCMF assigned to the DMD and the public key of the SACA deviceassigned to the DMD. The public keys are signed by the manufacturer andstored in secure storage of the DMD.

At step 1060, the manufacturing process configures the DMD forrestricted communication to pre-defined cellular and optical entitiesand inhibits wireless communications (WiFi) with the DMD. Thisconfiguration allows the DMD to read text displayed on the SACA'sdisplay screen using the DMD's digital camera and likewise allows theDMD to display information on its display screen that can be read by theSACA's digital camera.

At step 1070, the manufacturing process configures the DMD for end useroperation of a limited number of applications. In one embodiment, theoperation is limited to a single application that is used to receive anddisplay secure optical data communications with the dedicated SACAdevice. At step 1075, the manufacturing process configures the DMD forlimited I/O through touch screen, display, and camera only with limitedcellular communications to dedicated pre-set telephone number(s). Othertypes of communication, such as WiFi, are inhibited.

At step 1080, the manufacturing process configures the DMD tocontinuously check for removal from the enclosure. In one embodiment, ifremoval of the DMD is sensed, then the DMD is programmed to lock downstorage by encrypting storage with an encryption code rendering the DMDunusable. At step 1090, the manufacturing process configures the DMD toalways be in a powered on state and transmits a GPS heartbeat topredetermined cellular number. The GPS heartbeat indicates that the DMDis operational and further provides a current GPS location of the DMD.In this embodiment, the GPS device included in the DMD is activated withcommunications being allowed between the DMD and the GPS. At step 1095,the manufacturing process configures the DMD to default to a power savemode during times of non-use of the DMD device. FIG. 11 shows usage ofthe DMD enclosed in the secure enclosure after the manufacturing processhas concluded.

FIG. 11 is a component diagram depicting usage of a Dedicated MobileDevice (DMD). FIG. 11 processing commences at 1100 and shows the stepstaken during usage of a dedicated mobile device (DMD). At step 1110, theDMD process senses any incoming cellular messages from externalcontroller 1120. In one embodiment, incoming messages are only allowedfrom a set of one or more predefined numbers limiting exposure of thedevice from non-trusted numbers.

The DMD process determines whether a cellular message was received froma pre-defined control number with instructions to lock the DMD device(decision 1125). Such a lock command might be sent if the DMD device islost, stolen, or otherwise compromised. If a cellular message to lockthe device is received from a pre-defined control, then decision 1125branches to the ‘yes’ branch which branches to “lock” step 1130. On theother hand, if such a lock instruction was not received, then decision1125 branches to the ‘no’ branch for further processing. If a lockinstruction was received then, at step 1130, the process locks the DMDdevice. For example, the device might encrypt all data stored on theDMD's storage rendering the device unusable, permanently powered off, orthe like, to prevent unauthorized users from using the DMD.

If a lock instruction was not received then, at step 1140, the processsenses whether the DMD is properly secured in the enclosure. The processdetermines whether the DMD is properly secured in the enclosure and thatno tampering is evident on the enclosure or the DMD (decision 1150). Ifthe DMD is in the enclosure and no tampering is evident, then decision1150 branches to the ‘yes’ branch for further processing. On the otherhand, if the DMD is not properly secured in the enclosure or tamperingis evident, then decision 1150 branches to the ‘no’ branch whichperforms the “lock” device operation at step 1130.

If the DMD is properly secured in the enclosure and tampering is notevident then, at step 1160, the process senses usage of the device by auser. The process determines whether usage of the DMD is detected by anend user (decision 1170). If usage of the DMD by an end user isdetected, then decision 1170 branches to the ‘yes’ branch for furtherprocessing of steps 1175 through 1190. On the other hand, if usage ofthe DMD by an end user is not sensed, then decision 1170 branches to the‘no’ branch bypassing steps 1175 through 1190.

If usage of the DMD is detected, then steps 1175 through 1190 areperformed. At step 1175, the process senses authentication of the deviceby the end user. Authentication can include biometrics (e.g.,fingerprint, iris scan, etc.) of the end user, validation of a useridentifier and password, or any other authentication processes utilized.The process determines whether the end user has been authenticated(decision 1180). If the end user is authenticated, then decision 1180branches to the ‘yes’ branch to perform predefined process 1190. On theother hand, if the end user is not authenticated, perhaps indicatingthat the DMD has been obtained by a non-authorized user, then decision1180 branches to the ‘no’ branch whereupon the “lock” device process isperformed at step 1130 to protect the DMD from unauthorized use. Whenthe user is authenticated then, at predefined process 1190, the processperforms the routines described in FIGS. 4 through 6 (see these Figuresand corresponding text for processing details).

At step 1195, the process sends electronic heartbeat to predefinednumber with the heartbeat being a message that is sent over a cellularnetwork to a predefined number of the external controller. In oneembodiment, this electronic heartbeat includes a current GPS location ofthe DMD so that external controller can send a “lock device” instructionif the GPS location of the device is found to be outside a permittedgeographic area, perhaps indicating that the device has been stolen.

The present invention may be a system, a method, and/or a computerprogram product at any possible technical detail level of integration.The computer program product may include a computer readable storagemedium (or media) having computer readable program instructions thereonfor causing a processor to carry out aspects of the present invention.

The computer readable storage medium is a tangible device that canretain and store instructions for use by an instruction executiondevice. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but isnot limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device,an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, asemiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of thecomputer readable storage medium includes the following: a portablecomputer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), aread-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROMor Flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portablecompact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD),a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device such aspunch-cards or raised structures in a groove having instructionsrecorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. Acomputer readable storage medium, as used herein, does not include, andis not to be construed as being, transitory signals per se, such asradio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves,electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide or othertransmission media (e.g., light pulses passing through a fiber-opticcable), or electrical signals transmitted through a wire.

Computer readable program instructions described herein can bedownloaded to respective computing/processing devices from a computerreadable storage medium or to an external computer or external storagedevice via a network, for example, the Internet, a local area network, awide area network and/or a wireless network. The network may comprisecopper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wirelesstransmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and/oredge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in eachcomputing/processing device receives computer readable programinstructions from the network and forwards the computer readable programinstructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium withinthe respective computing/processing device.

Computer readable program instructions for carrying out operations ofthe present invention may be assembler instructions,instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions,machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions,state-setting data, configuration data for integrated circuitry, oreither source code or object code written in any combination of one ormore programming languages, including an object oriented programminglanguage such as Smalltalk, C++, or the like, and procedural programminglanguages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programminglanguages. The computer readable program instructions may executeentirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer, as astand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partlyon a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. Inthe latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user'scomputer through any type of network, including a local area network(LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to anexternal computer (for example, through the Internet using an InternetService Provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including,for example, programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gatearrays (FPGA), or programmable logic arrays (PLA) may execute thecomputer readable program instructions by utilizing state information ofthe computer readable program instructions to personalize the electroniccircuitry, in order to perform aspects of the present invention.

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of theinvention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented bycomputer readable program instructions.

These computer readable program instructions may be provided to aprocessor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, orother programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, suchthat the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computeror other programmable data processing apparatus, create means forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks. These computer readable program instructionsmay also be stored in a computer readable storage medium that can directa computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and/or otherdevices to function in a particular manner, such that the computerreadable storage medium having instructions stored therein comprises anarticle of manufacture including instructions which implement aspects ofthe function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram blockor blocks.

The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto acomputer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other deviceto cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer,other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computerimplemented process, such that the instructions which execute on thecomputer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement thefunctions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block orblocks.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods, and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in theflowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portionof instructions, which comprises one or more executable instructions forimplementing the specified logical function(s). In some alternativeimplementations, the functions noted in the blocks may occur out of theorder noted in the Figures. For example, two blocks shown in successionmay, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks maysometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon thefunctionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of theblock diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocksin the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implementedby special purpose hardware-based systems that perform the specifiedfunctions or acts or carry out combinations of special purpose hardwareand computer instructions.

While particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beobvious to those skilled in the art that, based upon the teachingsherein, that changes and modifications may be made without departingfrom this invention and its broader aspects. Therefore, the appendedclaims are to encompass within their scope all such changes andmodifications as are within the true spirit and scope of this invention.Furthermore, it is to be understood that the invention is solely definedby the appended claims. It will be understood by those with skill in theart that if a specific number of an introduced claim element isintended, such intent will be explicitly recited in the claim, and inthe absence of such recitation no such limitation is present. Fornon-limiting example, as an aid to understanding, the following appendedclaims contain usage of the introductory phrases “at least one” and “oneor more” to introduce claim elements. However, the use of such phrasesshould not be construed to imply that the introduction of a claimelement by the indefinite articles “a” or “an” limits any particularclaim containing such introduced claim element to inventions containingonly one such element, even when the same claim includes theintroductory phrases “one or more” or “at least one” and indefinitearticles such as “a” or “an”; the same holds true for the use in theclaims of definite articles.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: optically transmitting afirst set of data from a dedicated mobile device (DMD) to anotherdevice, wherein the optically transmitting comprises displaying thefirst set of data on a display screen included in the DMD; opticallyreceiving a second set of data at the DMD, wherein the second set ofdata is received at a digital camera included in the DMD; and verifying,based on the first and second sets of data, that the other device andthe DMD are bound to each other.
 2. The method of claim 1 furthercomprising: detecting whether the DMD is secured within a secureenclosure; in response to determining that the DMD is secured in thesecure enclosure, allowing the optical transmission of the first dataset and the receiving of the second data; and in response to determiningthat the DMD is unsecured, inhibiting usage of the DMD.
 3. The method ofclaim 2 wherein the secure enclosure inhibits use of cable connectionsto the DMD, and wherein the secure enclosure includes an inductivecharger to charge a battery that powers the DMD.
 4. The method of claim1 wherein the DMD is isolated, the isolation steps comprising:inhibiting wireless networking from the DMD to a limited set of one ormore telephone numbers; storing the set of telephone numbers in anonvolatile storage of the DMD; and inhibiting editing of the set oftelephone numbers by an end user.
 5. The method of claim 4 furthercomprising: inhibiting use of inputs to the DMD to a touch-enableddisplay screen of the DMD and the digital camera of the DMD.
 6. Themethod of claim 5 further comprising: limiting usage of the DMD by anend user to a limited set of one or more applications pre-installed onthe DMD; and inhibiting modification, by the end user, of the set ofapplications pre-installed on the DMD.
 7. The method of claim 4 furthercomprising: periodically transmitting data pertaining to an electronicheartbeat to one of the set of telephone numbers, wherein the dataincludes a set of global positioning data pertaining to the DMD;receiving instructional data from one of the set of telephone numbersresponsive to the periodic transmissions; and inhibiting use of the DMDin response to one of the instructional data when a possible threat tothe DMD has been detected.
 8. An information handling system that is adedicated mobile device (DMD), the information handling systemcomprising: one or more processors; a display screen accessible by atleast one of the processors; a digital camera accessible by at least oneof the processors; a memory coupled to at least one of the processors;and a set of computer program instructions stored in the memory andexecuted by at least one of the processors in order to perform actionscomprising: optically transmitting a first set of data from the DMD toanother device, wherein the optically transmitting comprises displayingthe first set of data on the DMD's display screen; optically receiving asecond set of data at the DMD, wherein the second set of data isreceived at the DMD's digital camera; and verifying, based on the firstand second sets of data, that the other device and the DMD are bound toeach other.
 9. The information handling system of claim 8 wherein theactions further comprise: detecting whether the DMD is secured within asecure enclosure; in response to determining that the DMD is secured inthe secure enclosure, allowing the optical transmission of the firstdata set and the receiving of the second data; and in response todetermining that the DMD is unsecured, inhibiting usage of the DMD. 10.The information handling system of claim 9 wherein the secure enclosureinhibits use of cable connections to the DMD, and wherein the secureenclosure includes an inductive charger to charge a battery that powersthe DMD.
 11. The information handling system of claim 8 wherein the DMDis isolated, the isolation steps comprising: inhibiting wirelessnetworking from the DMD to a limited set of one or more telephonenumbers; storing the set of telephone numbers in a nonvolatile storageof the DMD; and inhibiting editing of the set of telephone numbers by anend user.
 12. The information handling system of claim 11 wherein theactions further comprise: inhibiting use of inputs to the DMD to atouch-enabled display screen of the DMD and the digital camera of theDMD.
 13. The information handling system of claim 12 wherein the actionsfurther comprise: limiting usage of the DMD by an end user to a limitedset of one or more applications pre-installed on the DMD; and inhibitingmodification, by the end user, of the set of applications pre-installedon the DMD.
 14. The information handling system of claim 11 wherein theactions further comprise: periodically transmitting data pertaining toan electronic heartbeat to one of the set of telephone numbers, whereinthe data includes a set of global positioning data pertaining to theDMD; receiving instructional data from one of the set of telephonenumbers responsive to the periodic transmissions; and inhibiting use ofthe DMD in response to one of the instructional data when a possiblethreat to the DMD has been detected.
 15. A computer program productstored in a computer readable storage medium, comprising computerprogram code that, when executed by an information handling system,performs actions comprising: optically transmitting a first set of datafrom a dedicated mobile device (DMD) to another device, wherein theoptically transmitting comprises displaying the first set of data on adisplay screen included in the DMD; optically receiving a second set ofdata at the DMD, wherein the second set of data is received at a digitalcamera included in the DMD; and verifying, based on the first and secondsets of data, that the other device and the DMD are bound to each other.16. The computer program product of claim 15 wherein the actions furthercomprise: detecting whether the DMD is secured within a secureenclosure, wherein the secure enclosure inhibits use of cableconnections to the DMD, and wherein the secure enclosure includes aninductive charger to charge a battery that powers the DMD; in responseto determining that the DMD is secured in the secure enclosure, allowingthe optical transmission of the first data set and the receiving of thesecond data; and in response to determining that the DMD is unsecured,inhibiting usage of the DMD.
 17. The computer program product of claim15 wherein the DMD is isolated, the isolation steps comprising:inhibiting wireless networking from the DMD to a limited set of one ormore telephone numbers; storing the set of telephone numbers in anonvolatile storage of the DMD; and inhibiting editing of the set oftelephone numbers by an end user.
 18. The computer program product ofclaim 17 wherein the actions further comprise: inhibiting use of inputsto the DMD to a touch-enabled display screen of the DMD and the digitalcamera of the DMD.
 19. The computer program product of claim 17 whereinthe actions further comprise: limiting usage of the DMD by an end userto a limited set of one or more applications pre-installed on the DMD;and inhibiting modification, by the end user, of the set of applicationspre-installed on the DMD.
 20. The computer program product of claim 17wherein the actions further comprise: periodically transmitting datapertaining to an electronic heartbeat to one of the set of telephonenumbers, wherein the data includes a set of global positioning datapertaining to the DMD; receiving instructional data from one of the setof telephone numbers responsive to the periodic transmissions; andinhibiting use of the DMD in response to one of the instructional datawhen a possible threat to the DMD has been detected.